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Abstract 
 
SubSaharan Africa has seen a return to good economic growth performance in the last 
15 years, and especially in the last 5-10 years; as has been quite widely recognised, several 
factors have been important here, not just good performance of  commodities.  The 
World Bank’s global poverty statistics show a good reduction over the past 3 years, and 
two other studies have suggested that progress in poverty reduction associated with this 
growth has been impressive,  but there has been no careful assessment of  what 
household survey evidence says.  This paper represents a first move in that direction.  
Focusing on carefully conducted studies of  11 countries undertaken by leading African 
researchers, guided by specialist  international resource persons in the field, this paper 
synthesises what can be said about changes in monetary poverty using this evidence.  In 
addition the paper examines evidence on non-monetary outcomes from Demographic 
and Health Surveys, which were conducted more than once in all countries.  We find that 
poverty in both monetary and non-monetary terms has fallen in most countries, though 
to different extents in different countries.  Some countries have been successful in many 
dimensions over an extended period, while in others the pattern is either much less 
positive or more mixed.   Growth is probably only one factor behind the changes, and 
especially in relation to non-monetary poverty. 
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Introduction 
 
Steven Radelet's book Emerging Africa highlights the recovery to sustained growth since the mid-1990s 
in 17 African economies, combined with (and linked to) impressive progress in other fields including 
democracy, improved governance and the end of  conflict.  He identifies another six threshold countries 
which have also experienced positive change over this period.   Together this amounts to more than 
half  of  the countries in SubSaharan Africa and substantially more than half  the population.  Impressive 
recent growth performance in Africa has also been noted by The Economist who wrote in December 
2011 
 
“Over the past decade the simple unweighted average of  countries’ growth rates was virtually 
identical in Africa and Asia”  
and 
“The Economist finds that over the ten years to 2010, six of  the world’s ten fastest-growing 
economies were in sub-Saharan Africa” 
  
It's analysis also showed African GDP growth overtaking Asian GDP growth late in the last decade, 
and its forecasts suggested that 7 of  the fastest 10 growing economies in the 2010-15 period will be in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
Figure 1: SubSaharan African economic performance from 1960 to date 
 
 
 
Without doubt there has been an impressive recovery of  growth in Sub-Saharan Africa since the early 
to mid-1990s, which is highlighted in Figure 1.  The history of  largely negative per capita growth in 
SubSaharan Africa from the early 1970s to early 1990s is well known and much discussed.  But from 
the early to mid-1990s on there is a significant reversal: aggregate per capita GDP rose by 31% between 
1994 and 2010, an average of  1.7% a year.  And that average figure includes a number of  countries, 
some large countries such as the Democratic Republic of  Congo, which declined significantly over this 
period; many countries grew significantly faster than this over this period.  And the chart also indicates 
significantly faster growth over the last 7 years, when the average growth rate was 2.5% per annum. 
What underlay this impressive growth recovery?  This issue has been widely discussed.  Many have 
argued that commodities account for the main part of  this recovery, given that many African countries 
are resource rich; oil for instance is an important part of  the impressive growth performance in some 
cases of  good performance (e.g. Angola), but this applies only to a relatively small minority of  cases.  
Others which are not oil producers or even resource rich have also performed well in recent years (e.g. 
Ethiopia).  There has often been impressive growth in other sectors: frequently wholesale and retail 
trade, sometimes agriculture and sometimes manufacturing.  And even in resource rich countries, non-
resource based sectors have often shown impressive progress. 
Many other factors are important and are emphasised by Radelet among others.  The main factors 
Radelet identifies are progress towards democracy and government accountability in many countries, 
better macroeconomic management, substantially reduced debt and changing relations with the 
International Financial Institutions, new technology which among other things aids accountability, and 
a new generation of  political and business leaders.  Other important, often related, factors are the end 
of  many previous conflicts, a better business environment, more foreign inflows, evolving trade 
relations, urbanisation and reduced population growth rates in many countries.  Most of  these are 
structural and potentially sustainable changes, many unrelated to commodity prices. 
This is very positive news for SubSaharan Africa.  There is though currently much less systematic 
evidence of  the impact of  this hopefully sustained growth on poverty reduction, which is the focus of  
this paper.   The situation in terms of  the availability of  data to judge progress in poverty reduction has 
substantially improved over the last 20 years, but analysis of  change in poverty still requires an in-depth 
country study applying best practice techniques; for a multi-country study this is needed across many 
countries.  This is enabled for this paper by the papers conducted by a recently completed AERC 
collaborative research project, in which highly reputed African researchers, closely guided by leading 
international resource persons, applied consistent methodology to look at growth-poverty linkages in 
Africa, among other things reporting on poverty change over time. This involved case studies of  11 
countries using national poverty lines which were consistently estimated within countries over time.  
The poverty data is not comparable across countries, but the focus here is on change within countries 
over time.  Collectively these countries represent just under half  of  the population of  SubSaharan 
Africa. 
It is important to complement this analysis of  monetary poverty with a parallel analysis of  trends in 
non-monetary poverty indicators.  This is based this on indicators from Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS) data for the same countries, data sets which are generally comparable over time within 
countries (and even between countries).  These are data sets which have been collected more than once 
in all of  these countries over the past 15-20 years.   
It is important to look here at both monetary and various non-monetary measures of  poverty.  All are 
important welfare outcomes in their own right.  The indicators are often available for different years, 
reflecting the years in which the surveys were conducted.  Further, monetary outcomes can often 
fluctuate from one year to another, reflecting for example climatic conditions which affect agricultural 
harvests; several non-monetary measures may fluctuate less over time, changing more gradually but 
often in more sustained ways. 
The World Bank recently published analysis of  global extreme poverty based on internationally 
comparable poverty lines showed that the proportion of  the SubSaharan African population living 
below $1.25 a day fell from 52.3% in 2005 to 47.5% in 2008.  This represents impressive progress in a 
period of  3 years; and poverty fell by 11.9 percentage points between 1993 and 2008 and this compares 
to  a level of  extreme poverty of  59.4% in 1993. 
This though is the first paper which seeks to examine and synthesise evidence across a wide range of  
household surveys.  There are though two other recent papers have been written  on poverty change in 
SubSaharan Africa.  One by Sala-i-Martin and Pinhovskiy (2010) uses national accounts data from the 
Penn World Tables along with inequality data from the WIDER World Income Inequality Database 
(WIID) to produce annual estimates of  poverty, which is argued to be falling rapidly.  A second by 
Young (2010) uses DHS data from across African countries; he observes impressive progress in 
indicators from the DHS surveys which he argues to be inconsistent with the pattern of  change of  
GDP available from the Penn World Tables.  Both argue that poverty has been falling rapidly in Africa, 
Sala-i-Martin and Pinhovskiy in particular arguing that this is widespread across Africa. 
But to what extent is this pattern consistent with that revealed by household survey evidence, almost 
certainly the most reliable source of  poverty data in Africa?  This paper argues that, based on these 11 
significant country cases, household survey evidence does indeed show that there has been significant 
progress in poverty reduction in SubSaharan Africa in recent years.  However this has been much 
greater in some countries than others.  Growth has been a very important part of  that story, although 
countries' abilities to translate growth into poverty reduction vary because of  different patterns of  
change in inequality which in turn reflect policy factors and others. Growth though is a less important 
driver of  changes in non-monetary measures of  poverty, which often show different patterns to that 
shown by monetary poverty. 
To begin with this paper sets the context in section 2 by reviewing the evidence of  growth in the 25 
biggest African countries in more depth, including the 11 which are the subject of  more in depth 
poverty analysis.  Section 3 then briefly discusses the existing studies of  poverty change in Africa by 
Sala-i-Martin and Pinhovskiy (2010) and Young (2010).  Section 4 introduces the AERC collaborative 
project and summarises changes in monetary poverty and inequality from the results of  the country 
studies; it also discusses factors underlying the progress or lack of  progress in poverty reduction.  
Section 5 then presents DHS evidence on non-monetary indicators for the same countries.  In 
concluding, section 6 then returns to economic growth, discussing how important a factor this was for 
poverty reduction; it also discusses some significant research questions which further analysis could 
build on. 
2.  Economic Growth in SubSaharan Africa over the last 15 years 
In this section we first briefly focus on growth performance since 1995 in 25 of  the 26 largest countries 
in SubSaharan Africa, which collectively account for 92.8% of  the population; the omitted country is 
Somalia, the 25th largest, for which growth data is unavailable.  These include the 11 countries include in 
the AERC growth-poverty linkage project, but at this stage we focus on the full range of  countries to 
build a comprehensive picture of  the recent growth record. 
Table 1, based on data from the latest edition of  World Development Indicators, summarises average 
growth for constant price GDP in local currency units for each country for the whole period, and for 
different subperiods.  What this shows first is a very positive record of  growth performance over the 
period; 21 out of  the 25 countries show positive growth of  per capita GDP over the period, a much 
better record than any time over the previous 25 years. 
These figures highlight significant variations over countries and over time.  While per capita growth for 
SubSaharan Africa was 1.9% over the 15 year period, it was in fact barely greater than zero in the 1995-
2000 period (having been negative over the previous 5 years).  Growth was significantly faster in 2000-
2010 decade and particularly in the last five years.  There are also significant variations across countries.  
Nine countries grew at an per capita rate in excess of  3% over the 1995-2010 period, an increased of  
GDP of  more than 50% over the period.  Three countries had per capita growth rates above 4%, 
enough to increase per capita GDP by more than 80% over this 15 year period.  Among these fast 
growing countries Angola is an important oil producer, but Ethiopia is not.  Other fast growing 
countries which were not particularly resource rich include Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.  Figure 1 
highlights the local currency per capita GDP values, scaled such that 1995=100, of  11 of  the 25 
countries that increased their per capita GDP by more than 50% between 1995 and 2010.  The pattern 
here for most countries is of  consistently positive growth over the period, with acceleration in more 
recent years in several cases. 
Table 1: Average growth rates for the 25 largest African countries in the last 15 years 
 
1995-
2010 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2010 
2005-
2010 
Angola 6.2% 3.4% 7.5% 8.4% 
Benin 1.5% 2.2% 1.1% 1.7% 
Burkina Faso 3.0% 3.8% 2.7% 2.3% 
Cameroon 1.4% 2.3% 1.0% 0.6% 
Chad 3.1% -0.7% 5.1% -2.2% 
Congo DR -0.9% -6.2% 1.8% 2.6% 
Cote d'Ivoire -0.2% 0.7% -0.6% 0.4% 
Ethiopia 4.5% 1.7% 5.9% 8.0% 
Ghana 2.8% 1.8% 3.2% 4.0% 
Guinea 1.4% 2.2% 1.0% 0.2% 
Kenya 0.8% -0.5% 1.4% 1.9% 
Madagascar -0.1% 0.6% -0.4% 0.0% 
Malawi 1.6% 1.3% 1.7% 4.2% 
Mali 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 1.5% 
Mozambique 5.1% 4.6% 5.3% 4.8% 
Nigeria 2.8% 0.7% 3.8% 4.1% 
Niger  0.4% -0.7% 0.9% 1.4% 
Rwanda 3.9% 2.3% 4.7% 4.4% 
Senegal 1.3% 1.5% 1.3% 0.7% 
South Africa 1.6% 0.4% 2.2% 2.0% 
Sudan 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 4.6% 
Tanzania 3.2% 1.6% 4.0% 3.8% 
Uganda 3.6% 2.9% 4.0% 4.6% 
Zambia 2.1% 0.1% 3.1% 3.9% 
Zimbabwe -3.1% 0.4% -4.7% -1.6% 
     
Population averaged 
growth  1.9% 0.1% 2.4% 2.9% 
Source: Computed from World Development Indicators 2011. 
 
Over this period per capita GDP fell in only four countries, and only in two (Democratic Republic of  
Congo and Zimbabwe) was the reduction substantial.  Figure 2 highlights the recent growth trajectory 
for these four declining countries, again scaled such that 1995=100.  This shows that Zimbabwe is a 
case of  persistent decline, while Democratic Republic of  Congo shows evidence of  modest growth in 
the last decade.  Côte d'Ivoire showed reasonable growth performance in the late 1990s, but decline 
throughout most of  the 2000s. 
 
Figure 1: Growth performance of  11 countries increasing their per capita GDP by more than 
50%, 1995-2010 (local currency units, 1995=100) 
 
Figure 2: Growth performance of  four countries declining in per capita GDP, 1995-2010 (local 
currency values, 1995=100) 
 
The factors potentially underlying this impressive growth recovery have been discussed briefly in the 
previous section.  While commodities have been an important part of  the story, there is strong reason 
to believe that this growth reflects a much wider range of  economic, political and social factors, and 
that is much more broadly based. The prospects for its sustainability are therefore much more positive.  
Growth has continued even following the 2007 financial crisis, which  nonetheless did impact on 
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Africa. 
Growth in the last five years has been atypically high by historical standards, but 21 of  the 25 countries 
have seen sustained positive average per capita growth at least 15 years, and only two have experienced 
sharp declines (DR Congo and Zimbabwe).  There has been an impressive recovery of  growth in 
SubSaharan Africa. But how much of  this has translated into improvements in the living conditions of  
ordinary Africans?  How much has it contributed to poverty reduction, in particular given the factors 
which may have contributed to this growth? 
3.  Existing studies of  recent poverty change in Africa 
As noted in the introduction, two recent studies have been conducted, by Sala-i-Martin and Pinhovskiy 
(2010) and Young (2010), have argued that SubSaharan Africa has experienced impressive poverty 
reduction in recent years, although neither study has drawn on the wealth of  household survey now 
available for Africa.  We briefly here present a review of  these studies, forming the basis for the 
subsequent analysis which draws on household survey evidence.    
The most publicised study has been that undertaken by Sala-i-Martin and Pinhovskiy (2010) and 
published as an NBER working paper.  The title of  their paper summarises their story - “African 
poverty has been falling – much faster than you think”.  They argue that recent growth in Africa has 
been accompanied by falling inequality and has been associated with rapid poverty reduction; they 
reckon that Africa will be in a position to meet the first Millennium Development Goal by about 2017, 
just two years late.  They argue too that the poverty reduction has been widespread, occurring in 
countries that are resource rich as well as those that are not, countries that are landlocked as well as 
coastal, countries substantially affected by the slave trade as well as those that were not etc.   
Their study is one of  a number of  studies which uses national accounts data as a basis for estimating 
poverty, in conjunction with data on distribution, an approach Sala-i-Martin himself  played a lead role 
in developing (Sala-i-Martin, 2006) though several others have contributed (Bhalla, 2003; Karshenas, 
2003, among others).  It is a common pattern in many countries that data on consumption available 
from the national accounts is not consistent with that available from household surveys; in different 
cases household surveys may give higher or lower estimates of  consumption than the national 
accounts, and often significantly different (higher or lower) growth rates.  The underlying consumption 
concepts and coverage are different, so it is important that this is adjusted for before making the 
comparison (this adjustment is not always made).  But even once the concepts are similar, significant 
differences remain; the question then is which estimate is more reliable.  Bhalla, Sala-i-Martin and 
others argue that the national accounts estimates are more accurate; on this basis they seek to estimate 
poverty using the national accounts to establish the average level of  income or consumption and its 
change over time (so enabling annual observations) and household survey data (available periodically) 
to provide the estimate of  inequality.  This is sufficient information to produce estimates of  poverty, 
which can now be estimated on an annual basis.  Working on this basis Bhalla argued in 2003 that the 
first MDG had been met years  before. 
There has been a robust critique of  this approach by those defending the traditional household survey 
approach, and this issue particularly came to a head around a contentious debate in India about trends 
in poverty there where national accounts and surveys seemed to be suggesting different messages 
(Deaton and Dreze, 2002; Deaton and Kozel, 2005; Ravallion, 2000).  Ravallion argues strongly against 
anchoring poverty data to the national accounts and Deaton also robustly defends the household 
survey approach as being preferable.  In the specific context of  Africa, the quality of  survey data has 
improved significantly over recent years, with countries also learning from each other, multilateral and 
bilateral agencies and international experts, while in many countries the quality of  national accounts 
data, which have been much less the focus of  attention, must be open to serious question. 
Returning to Sala-i-Martin and Pinhovskiy (2010) they used GDP data (note, not consumption) in 
purchasing power parity (PPP) dollar terms from the Penn World Tables as the basis for their poverty 
estimates, and combined this with estimates of  inequality from the World Income Inequality Database 
(WIID) compiled by WIDER.  They use this to produce annual estimates of  poverty at a country level 
and for Africa as a whole, and to do so in dollar a day terms.  In terms of  distribution, they argue that 
the WIID data shows that inequality has been falling in Africa.  But the basis for this conclusion based 
on this source must be open to serious question.  The WIID database is a catalogue of  different 
estimates of  inequality and a useful research resource, but it provides very little if  any information on 
the underlying methods and on comparability.  Appendix Table 1 reports data available in WIID for 
one country, Ghana, and shows a dramatic range of  estimates of  Gini coefficients available for the 
same or adjacent years; by selective choice of  figures this data could justify any trend on inequality.  The 
point is that this is simply not a plausible data source for this purpose. 
Using this information and various imputation techniques, Sala-i-Martin and Pinhovskiy (2010) present 
their calculations of  dollar a day poverty change in Africa; figures 3 and 4 from their paper report their 
preferred estimates of  changes in overall poverty and inequality respectively.  Poverty is estimated to 
have fallen from about 43% in 1990 to around 32% in 2007, which if  projected forward is not far off  
the rate needed to meet MDG1.  Figure 4 shows falling inequality; this in conjunction with strong 
growth performance translates into impressive poverty reduction. 
Figure 3: Estimated trends in African Poverty According to Sala-i-Martin and Pinhovskiy 
(2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The evolution of  inequality in Africa according to Sala-i_Martin and Pinhovskiy 
(2010) 
 
They also present estimates for change changes in poverty in the four largest SubSaharan African 
countries.  Taking the examples of  Ethiopia and Nigeria the plots they show of  GDP and poverty 
show how strongly the poverty reduction trends are the mirror image of  the changes in GDP.  The 
charts show an apparent massive reduction in poverty in Ethiopia from more than 80% in the mid-
1980s to less than 30% in 2007, and in Nigeria from around 52% in the late 1980s to about 26% in 
2007.  These estimates, from countries representing 28% of  the SubSaharan African population, do not 
appear to be consistent with the more modest (though still impressive) pattern of  poverty reduction at 
the aggregate level.  Further, the GDP data in these charts do not seem to be available in the Penn 
World Tables data set; these charts raise a number of  serious questions about not just the method but 
also its application. 
Sala-i-Martin and Pinhovskiy (2010) argue that the pattern of  impressive poverty reduction applies 
across a wide range of  African countries. But sufficient doubts have been raised here about the 
underlying method to raise serious questions about the reliability of  their results: the justification for 
preferring national accounts data over survey data; the use of  GDP rather than suitable adjusted 
consumption; the highly non-transparent use of  the unreliable WIID data set; the consistency of  
country level evidence with the aggregate.  Carefully conducted analysis relying on household survey 
data is likely to give a much more reliable pattern of  poverty change. 
Young (2010) adopts a very different approach which is based on survey data, in this case that collected 
by the DHS surveys which have now been conducted more than once in a majority of  African 
countries.  He refers to the “African Growth Miracle”; according to the DHS data many welfare 
indicators, including ownership of  durable goods, housing quality, education, mortality and female 
leisure time have all been dramatically increasing over the last two decades, at around 3 per cent per 
annum.  He then suggests there is a gross inconsistency between DHS evidence and Penn World 
Tables.  Based on a series of  carefully conducted panel cross country econometric models, including of  
demand equations based on DHS data on asset ownership and estimates of  returns to education, he 
argues that the consumption variables he derived are strongly related to real income, as measured by 
years of  education.  The DHS data appear internally consistent, and imply a much higher rate of  
growth than that implies by Penn World Tables; he argues that the latter are underestimating growth 
progress substantially.  Young's findings though have been strongly challenged in a recent study by 
Hartgen et al (2011). 
The DHS data are an extremely valuable source of  information on living conditions in Africa, and have 
the advantage of  being largely comparable across countries and over time.  This data will be revisited 
later in this paper, where it will be suggested that how positive the pattern of  change is perceived to be 
depends somewhat on the indicator selected. 
The paper now turns to country level evidence on poverty drawing on household survey evidence, 
almost certainly the most reliable way of  measuring poverty, as long as the surveys concerned are 
indeed comparable.  Because the focus of  the paper is on country level progress, this discussion will be 
conducted in terms of  national poverty lines and in local currency, not in terms of  dollar a day 
denominated poverty measures, which introduce the major complexity of  identifying valid PPP 
exchange rates, an issue which is increasingly open to question following the 2008 rebasing exercise.  To 
the extent that this is related to growth, this is considered in local currency values in real terms, so it is 
not necessary to rely on Penn World Tables, as used by both Sala-i-Martin-Pinhovskiy and Young.   
The AERC collaborative Growth-Poverty Nexus Project, which was conducted between 2008 and 
2011, provides the opportunity by providing carefully conducted thorough country level studies of  
changes in poverty, which apply best practice in assessing changes of  poverty.  We have explicitly 
chosen not to use the data compiled and reported by PovcalNet; it is preferable here not to focus on 
dollar denominated poverty measures given the exchange rate difficulty; but more importantly there are 
serious questions about the comparability of  the different survey data reported there, for which little 
documentation is provided.  The poverty analysis here is based on a country’s own surveys, analuysed 
always in local currency values.   This is the evidence base on which the discussion of  monetary poverty 
in this paper will be based on, and it will be supplemented by examining evidence from DHS surveys.  
4.  Lessons on changes in poverty from the AERC Growth-Poverty Nexus Project 
In 2008 AERC began a collaborative research project looking at the linkages between growth and 
poverty reduction in Africa. This followed an earlier multi-donor project on Operationalising Pro-Poor 
Growth conducted over 2003-05, which had included six African case studies1.  The African growth 
acceleration of  the 2000s had not really been reflected in these studies, and it was important to draw on 
a wider evidence base across Africa.  The project first involved framework papers which focused on: 
growth-poverty-inequality linkages; globalisation; the labour market; informality; agriculture; social 
protection; and spatial patterns of  growth.  Following this 13 country case studies were conducted: 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon (2), Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria (2), 
Senegal.  A number of  these country studies picked up one of  the themes from the framework papers, 
though not all did; almost all of  them presented the evolution of  consistently-measured monetary 
poverty in their countries over years with comparable data, the exception being Chad where there were 
not two comparable household income/consumption surveys available.  In this section of  the paper we 
summarise the poverty – and inequality – messages emerging from the study; in the following section 
we look at explanations for the observed outcomes. 
All of  these countries experienced positive growth over the 1995-2010 period, at rates which vary from 
an annual average of  0.8% in Kenya to 4.5% in Ethiopia.  Other reasonably fast growing countries 
included here are Burkina Faso (3.0%), Ghana (2.8%) and Nigeria (2.8%); the remaining countries grew 
at more modest rates.  In addition almost all the poverty data which is reported here concerns periods 
after the growth recovery of  the past 15 years; this is a good basis to assess what has happened to 
poverty in a number of  important African countries in this period of  improved growth performance. 
Table 2 summarises monetary poverty and inequality, where estimates are currently available, for these 
ten countries, and for cases where surveys are genuinely believed to be comparable.  The incidence of  
poverty is reported in all cases.  All cases here show poverty in the final period to be lower than that in 
the first period, though when more than two years are available the pattern is not necessarily 
monotonic e.g. Kenya, Guinea, Burkina Faso. The impressive success story cases here are Ghana and 
                                                 
1 Burkina Faso, Ghana, Senegal, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia. 
Senegal, both of  which experienced fast, monotonic poverty reduction over 14 and 11 years 
respectively.  Over this period Ghana almost halved its incidence of  poverty and Senegal would also 
appear to be on track to achieve this.  On this evidence these countries seem well placed to achieve 
MDG1.   
Table 2: Data on poverty and inequality from AERC Growth-Poverty Nexus Case Studies 
country year 
incidence 
of  poverty 
severity of  
poverty inequality 
urban 
poverty 
rural 
poverty 
       
Benin 2006 37.4   35 39 
 2007 33.3   28 36 
 2010 35.2   30 38 
       
Burkina 
Faso 1994 54.1 12.2 0.54 12.1 64.2 
 1998 60.2 15.4 0.5 20.2 71.9 
 2003 40.7 7.5 0.5 12.6 48.1 
       
Cameroon 1996 53.3 9 0.406 41.4 59.6 
 2001 40.2 7 0.408 22.1 49.9 
 2007 39.9 5 0.39 12.2 55 
       
Ethiopia 1995/96 46     
 2004/05 39     
       
Ghana 1992 51.7 4.7 0.231   
 1999 39.5 3.6 0.255   
 2006 28.5 2.6 0.286   
       
Guinea 1994/95 63.9 18 0.49 21.2 84.9 
 2002/03 49.1 8.1 0.48 23.5 59.9 
 2007 53 8.1 0.43 30.5 63 
       
Kenya 1992 46.3   29.3 46.3 
 1994 46.8  0.46 28.9 46.8 
 1997 52.3  0.43 49.2 52.9 
 2005/06 45.9  0.39 33.7 49.1 
       
Malawi 2004 52  0.39   
 2005     53 
 2006 45     
 2008 40     
 2009 39    43 
       
Nigeria 1996 65.6   58.2 69.8 
 2004 57.8   35.4 64.1 
       
Senegal 1995 61.4 9.1 0.415  65.9 
 2001 48.5 6.2 0.434  57.5 
 2006 40 6.3 0.353  63.8 
 
In addition to these two most successful countries in terms of  poverty reduction, Ethiopia and Nigeria 
also managed to reduce poverty to reasonable extents  So too did Malawi in recent years, but here it is 
important to note that the evidence on the trend in poverty post 2005 is based on estimates of  
consumption made from poverty predictors from surveys that did not collect consumption data; this 
evidence is likely to be less robust than other estimates, but it nonetheless suggests reasonable progress 
since 200, at least in the assets and characteristics used for these predictions.  In the cases where 
poverty has fluctuated up and down (Burkina Faso, Guinea, Kenya) the overall reduction has been 
modest in most cases, but both Burkina Faso and Kenya have seen good and reasonable poverty 
reduction respectively in the most recent time period.  Cameroon's poverty reduction between 1996 and 
2001 appears to have stopped in the 2000s; the period for Benin is short, but shows slow progress in 
poverty reduction over these years. 
It is important always to remember that surveys tell us about poverty outcomes in the years when 
surveys are conducted; these years may be affected by special climatic or other factors which makes 
economic performance in one year particularly good or bad.  In other words patterns based on two or 
three surveys are not necessarily indicative of  longer term trends, and need to be carefully interpreted 
on a country by country basis.  Nonetheless, the overall message from these figures is poverty has fallen 
in almost all cases, though to significantly different extents: two countries have done well, several others 
have reduced poverty to reasonable extents or in more recent periods, but Cameroon shows 
disappointing progress in the last decade. While the period covered by these surveys is not the same as 
that considered by Sala-i-Martin and Pinhovskiy, this is not a uniform picture of  widespread poverty 
reduction; some countries have done significantly better than others. 
The same table also presents information on other dimensions of  changes in poverty and also 
inequality, where the data is reported in the country studies.  Thus in five cases information is reported 
in the change in the severity of  poverty; this falls in all cases between the first and last year reported 
here.  It falls to the greatest extent in Guinea, from 18% in 1994/5 to 8% in 2007. In Burkina Faso it 
follows the pattern of  the incidence of  poverty by first increasing between 1994 and 1998, and then 
falling by more than the previous increase between 1998 and 2003.  Urban-rural disaggregations are 
available in six cases; rural poverty falls everywhere except for Kenya, but urban poverty in fact 
increases in Burkina Faso, Guinea and Kenya.  In Cameroon and Nigeria by contrast urban poverty 
falls much faster than rural poverty. 
For the six cases where inequality information is available, it in fact falls in six countries, the exception 
being Ghana.  The reductions are larger in Guinea, Kenya and Senegal, and of  course contribute to 
poverty reduction in these countries.  Inequality even falls in a commodity rich country such as Guinea, 
implying that growth which may be partly driven by commodities need not necessarily be associated 
with increased inequality. 
The general pattern that emerges from this analysis is of  falling levels of  poverty, though only at fast 
rates in some cases.  Urban poverty sometimes rises but rural poverty falls in most cases; and in a 
majority of  instances inequality in fact is seen to fall.  The next section will consider in more detail 
factors which have contributed to greater and lesser poverty reduction in different cases.   
We now briefly consider the association between poverty reduction and economic growth. The growth 
rates of  the 11 AERC country case study growth rates are plotted in figure 3.  Cameroon shows zero 
growth in per capita GDP over this twenty year period, and Kenya's per capita GDP in 2010 is scarcely 
greater than it was 20 years before in 1990.  Relatively faster growth was experienced in Ghana over this 
entire period, in Burkina Faso from about 1995 onwards, and in Ethiopia and Nigeria in the latter half  
of  the period; these periods saw significant poverty reduction in each case.  Malawi showed good 
growth performance over the last five years, a period over which the data suggests poverty fell relatively 
quickly.  By contrast, Senegal grew relatively slowly over the period but seems to have reduced poverty 
substantially; here falling inequality seems to be the key story. 
Over the period for which poverty data is available for Cameroon growth was positive from 1996 to 
2001, so some poverty reduction took place, but poverty did not fall between 2001 and 2007 despite 
some positive growth over this period.  Poverty scarcely changed in Kenya from 1992 to 2006, over 
which period per capita GDP remained largely unchanged; however some recovery of  growth in the 
mid 2000s may be associated with poverty reduction which happened between 1997 and 2005/06.  
Benin and Guinea show relatively anaemic growth performance over the period which accompanies 
very modest progress in poverty reduction. 
Figure 3: Constant price GDP in local currency units for AERC country case study countries, 
1990=100 
 
It would be expected that changes in monetary poverty should indeed reflect patterns of  growth, 
moderated by what is happening to inequality. The measure of  growth considered here is per capita 
GDP, not the growth in household consumption, but the evidence does generally suggest that in many 
cases countries with a better growth performance tend to have a better record in terms of  poverty 
reduction.  In general the growth recovery has been associated with progress in poverty reduction. The 
importance of  what happens to inequality with growth though is clearly demonstrated by the case of  
Senegal; inequality appears to have fallen to quite a large extent in Senegal, and this as much as growth 
performance appears to have been an important driving factor in poverty reduction.  If  this fall in 
inequality is a wider phenomenon across Africa then the impact of  the growth on poverty reduction 
will be even greater. 
We will shortly consider the trend in non-monetary indicators of  poverty.  First, we briefly consider 
based on the AERC country studies the factors that seem to have been important in growth and 
poverty reduction; an important part of  being able to explain growth and poverty reduction and judge 
its sustainability is the ability to explain the observed outcomes.  This can necessarily only be discussed 
relatively briefly in this paper.  
 5.  Factors driving the poverty changes in the AERC country case studies 
The AERC project expected all country studies to report their growth and poverty reduction history 
(the latter summarised above), requested authors to identify if  there were any paradoxes in their 
growth-poverty relationships, and then come up with an explanation for the observed outcomes.  A 
number of  these explanations did relate to topics covered in the thematic papers for the project; in 
other cases the discussion was more general and not clearly linked to any one thematic paper; in these 
cases the studies focused more on an analysis of  the pro-poorness or otherwise of  growth, perhaps 
along with some regression analysis.  One of  the Nigerian studies focused explicitly at describing state-
level outcomes in non-monetary welfare outcomes. 
The three strongest themes emerging from the country studies were the role of  agriculture, the  
operation of  labour markets and spatial inequality in development, although other issues were picked 
up in one or more study.  Agriculture remains the dominant economic activity for most poor African 
countries, and all countries represented here depend heavily on the sector..  This was examined in some 
depth in the studies of  Burkina Faso and Malawi.  In Burkina Faso (Siri et al, 2011) an analysis was 
made of  the choice of  production technique on yields using propensity score matching to conduct an 
impact evaluation, focusing in particular on mechanisation and improved seeds.  Both show significant 
positive impacts on yield, particularly for the case of  improved seeds.  The paper did not strongly link 
this to poverty; but the use of  both mechanisation and improved seeds is significantly greater in regions 
of  the country which have higher agricultural potential and are less poor to start with.  In Malawi 
(Muhome-Matita and Chirwa, 2011) a regression based assessment of  the impact of  access to 
subsidised fertilisers, a major and high profile policy initiative there, was conducted.  Receiving a 
subsidy has a significant positive impact on agricultural growth, but unfortunately this impact is 
significantly less for the poor even if  in principle the poor (or at any rate those having access to social 
safety nets) should have more access to the fertiliser subsidies.  Both of  these studies highlight the risk 
that technical or other policy solutions targeted at raising agricultural productivity may benefit the poor 
less.  Agriculture of  course emerges as an important in almost all country studies.  An analysis of  
sectoral growth in Benin (Mededji et al, 2011) shows unsurprisingly that growth in the agricultural 
sectors and to some extent food processing has a bigger impact on poverty reduction.  But the previous 
results suggest that a number of  policies to promote agricultural growth may disproportionately benefit 
less poor farmers.  
The labour market was a second important theme in the country studies.  Many studies disaggregated 
poverty by the sector in which the household primarily worked; in almost all cases poverty is highest by 
far among those working in agriculture and lowest among formal sector wage earners in the public or 
private sector; the non-farm self-employed and informal wage earners tended to lie in between.  This is 
a common and unsurprising finding. Studies in Cameroon (Tabi and Ngantcha, 2011) and Ethiopia 
(Alemu et al, 2011) analysed the labour market in more depth.  In Cameroon the numbers working in 
the formal sector, especially in the private sector, fell between 2001 and 2007.  However, poverty levels, 
low to start with, fell in this group over the period; it may have been that the poor were more likely to 
lose their jobs.  There was a large increase in the numbers working in informal activities, both 
agricultural and especially non-agricultural; poverty fell among the non-farm self  employed (though less 
than for formal sector wage earners) and among non-farm wage earners, though not for those in 
agriculture on their own farms or especially those working for wages in agriculture (a significant poor 
group in Africa, though insufficiently recognised in existing studies).  In Ethiopia the availability of  
panel data allowed a study of  poverty mobility.  In urban areas unsurprisingly the unemployed and 
pensioners are most likely to be poorer, to reduce their consumption or move into poverty; the self  
employed, as well as private sector workers are more likely to increase their consumption or move out 
of  poverty.  In rural areas employment type is not significantly associated with poverty movements, but 
of  course most work in agriculture.  In general the authors conclude that the labour market did not play 
an effective role in linking growth to poverty reduction, a conclusion which probably also applies to the 
case of  Cameroon. 
Many studies disaggregate poverty and its changes over time geographically, and discuss regional 
differences; this latter is a main focus in studies of  Cameroon (Fambon and Tamba, 2011), Ghana 
(Jatoe et al, 2011) and Nigeria (Ichoku et al, 2011).   In each case important geographic differences in 
poverty reduction are observed.  In Cameroon there was significant growth and poverty reduction in 
the main cities of  Douala and Yaoundé; some poorer regions such as in the north showed falling 
average expenditures and increasing poverty, while other poorer regions such as the north-west and 
south showed some progress.  The overall pattern was not such as to increase inequality;  the study 
though did not discuss why the growth pattern took the form it did, nor whether fast growth in Douala 
and Yaoundé was associated with concentration of  activity there.  In both Ghana and Nigeria there is 
an important long-established poverty differential between the north and south of  the country.  This is 
the explicit focus of  the Ghana study; in both cases it would be helpful to know to what extent this 
pattern represents natural advantages of  the coastal locations, previous concentration of  activities and 
populations there, demographic factors (average family sizes are higher in the north) or policies.  In 
Ghana, while the north remains far behind the south in development terms, there has been significant 
progress in the north over the past decade; in Nigeria by contrast there seems to have been much faster 
poverty reduction in the south.  What factors underlie this difference is an important question.  In 
addition Oyekale et al (2011) examine differences between states and regions in Nigeria in non-income 
measures of  wellbeing (chiefly based on an asset index).  Again northern states are significantly 
disadvantaged and this gap has persisted over time, if  perhaps with a slight convergence between 1999 
and 2008 (different years from those for which the monetary poverty data are available). 
Chad and Guinea are resource rich countries, the former having started to extract oil over the past 
decade, the latter with many minerals including bauxite.  Oil is a significant revenue earner for Chad; 
the paper (Ndang and Nan-Guer, 2011) focuses on the impact on public revenues and on the areas in 
which the government.  Spending on defence has recently overtaken education and health; also the 
former are the areas where actual spending exceeded planned spending in contrast to the latter.  But 
there have been significant increases in spending on education in particular.  It is likely to be too early 
to see the effects of  this, and in any case the most recent data on welfare indicators dates from 2004, 
just after the extraction of  oil began.  But clearly it is important to monitor the public spending which 
oil revenue enables for this very poor country.  In Guinea (Kaba et al, 2011) minerals account for 
around 15% of  GDP but the terms on which Guinea is able to sell its bauxite to the world market as 
well as the presence of  major elements of  corruption linked to this sector mean that the economy has 
derived relatively little benefit from the minerals it has.  Greater transparency in conventions linked to 
minerals will help Guinea gain more from its vast wealth of  resources, with potentially beneficial 
implications for poverty reduction. 
In Kenya (Kabubo-Mariara et al, 2011) the authors look at the role of  institutional factors at the district 
level in accounting for growth in expenditure at the household and community level.  Institutional 
factors are widely reported as being important determinants of  growth at the country level, and there 
has been some analysis of  the link between institutions and inequality at a country level.  At the district 
level proximity to facilities such as markets and district headquarters are important determinants of  
outcomes in rural areas as are crime levels; a number of  institutional factors including market access are 
also found to be associated with inequality, although gender and security factors seem to make a very 
small contribution to inequality.  In Senegal (Diene, 2011) migration, both international and internal, is 
identified as a key route out of  poverty. 
The country case studies clearly identify a number of  important drivers of  poverty.  Agriculture and 
labour markets play a key role, but policies in relation to both do not seem to have been sufficiently 
effective in delivering greater poverty reduction.  Better institutions and migration do help poverty 
reduction, but again whether the poor benefit disproportionately from these is open to discussion.  
Resources in principle should be a major resource for a country enabling government to increase 
spending in key areas which can help poverty reduction.  How much these resources are first mobilised 
(e.g. Guinea) and then effectively used by government to support development spending (e.g. Chad, 
Nigeria) remains very much open to question; Africa still has relatively few examples of  countries 
which have managed their resource wealth well. 
To this point the discussion in this paper has focused on the country studies conducted by the AERC 
growth-poverty project and the evidence they assembled.  We now seek to extend the evidence of  these 
studies, which mostly looked at monetary poverty, to look at progress in a number of  important non-
monetary measures of  welfare, in particular looking at health indicators from the Demographic and 
Health Surveys, which are available at more than one point in time for all countries considered here. 
6.  Extending the poverty evidence to non-monetary dimensions 
While the non-monetary dimensions of  poverty may be less directly related to economic growth, 
growth could also have an important impact, in particular through influencing the resources available to 
a government or even to individual households.  For growth to have a positive impact through on non-
monetary outcomes through government spending, growth must translate into increased government 
revenue, and then that revenue must be effectively spent in the areas (health, education etc) relevant to 
the outcome; it must also effectively reach the poor.  There are many potentially weak links in this 
chain.  In addition many other factors, which may be totally unrelated to growth, may be important 
such as aid, the actions of  non-governmental organisations etc.; again similar issues of  effectiveness of  
delivery and of  the reach of  the services arise. 
For looking at non-monetary outcomes, and in particular health outcomes, the Demographic and 
Health Surveys (DHS) represent a very valuable resource.  These surveys use a more or less common 
questionnaire across countries and over time within countries;  it therefore follows that the indicators 
they collect in different surveys tend to be comparable, taking account of  some changes that are made.  
Here again we focus on changes within a given country over time, and not on cross country 
comparisons.  Relying on DHS surveys rather than data available from World Development Indicators 
or Human Development Reports has the advantage of  being more sure of  the source of  the data and 
its comparability over time; it an also be disaggregated even if  we do not exploit this here.  For this 
reason we only use the DHS data here, even if  it might not be the most natural source of  some 
indicators (e.g. education). 
Five potential outcome indicators derived from DHS data for these 11 countries are presented in Table 
3, along with the total fertility rate to which reference will be made later.  These are the percentage of  
mothers who have completed secondary education, the infant mortality rate, the stunting and 
underweight measures of  malnutrition, and the percentage of  children fully vaccinated.  The periods of  
time covered here differ from one country to another; some had their first DHS survey in the late 
1980s and have a long run of  indicators, others were only initially surveyed more recently. 
Focusing first on education, the story is of  quite rapid increases in all countries, though from a very low 
base in a number of  cases (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea).  The most rapid increase (and highest 
final level) is observed in Ghana, followed by Nigeria and Cameroon; but the rates of  increase were 
more modest in several other cases including Ethiopia, Kenya and Senegal.  The levels remain very low 
in Benin, Chad and Guinea, though do increase over the period.  This expansion of  education across 
SubSaharan Africa is well known and is starting to show a big effect at secondary level. 
Table 3: Some key non-monetary indicators from Demographic and Health Surveys  
 
% with 
secondary 
education 
infant 
mortality 
rate 
% of 
children 
stunted 
% of 
children 
u'weight 
%   fully 
vaccinated 
total 
fertility 
rate 
       
Benin 1996 9.4 103 25 29.2 55.6 6 
Benin 2001 13.9 95 26.9 23.6 47.1 5.6 
Benin 2006 16.4 76 35.3 22.5 47.1 5.7 
       
Burkina Faso 1993 6.6 108 28.6 34.8 34.6 6.5 
Burkina F 1998-9 5.8 109 30.9 36.3 29.3 6.4 
Burkina Faso 2003 8.7 92 33.6 39.2 43.9 5.9 
       
Cameroon 1991 26.5 80 22.9 16.3 40 5.8 
Cameroon 1998 33.3 80 29.3 22.2 35.8 4.8 
Cameroon 2004 39.1 81 29.7 19.4 48.2 5 
       
Chad 1996-97 3.8 110 34.9 39.1 11.3 6.4 
Chad 2004 6.4 115 35.3 37.1 11.3 6.3 
       
Ethiopia 2000 9.1 113 44.9 45.3 14.3 5.5 
Ethiopia 2005 11.9 80 41.1 35.5 20.4 5.4 
       
Ghana 1988 7.5 81 29.4 30.3 18.8 6.4 
Ghana 1993 10.3 75 25.9 27.3 54.8 5.2 
Ghana 1998 52.8 61 20 24.9 62 4.4 
Ghana 2003 51.8 65 26.7 23.5 69.4 4.4 
Ghana 2008 58.6 54 18.8 18.7 79 4 
       
Guinea 1999 9.4 107 23.2 25.4 32.2 5.5 
Guinea 2005 11.1 110 30.3 26.2 37.2 5.7 
       
Kenya 1989 20.4 59   44 6.7 
Kenya 1993 24.5 63 31.2 23.3 78.2 5.4 
Kenya 1998 29.2 71 30.9 21.5 59.5 4.7 
Kenya 2003 29.3 75 30.1 20.1 51.8 4.9 
Kenya 2008-09 34.3 59 29.8 19.5 68.3 4.6 
       
Malawi 1992 4.4 136 41.5 27.8 81.8 6.7 
Malawi 2000 11.1 112 44 27.8 70.1 6.3 
Malawi 2004 15.5 93 44.3 22.5 64.4 6 
Malawi 2010 20 73 39.3 18.6 80.9 5.7 
       
Nigeria 1990 18.9 92 36.2 34.6 29 6 
Nigeria 1999 36.7 71 45.5 27.3 16.8 4.7 
Nigeria 2003 37 109 35.8 29.3 12.9 5.7 
Nigeria 2008 44.6 87 35.5 27.8 22.7 5.7 
       
Senegal 1986 9.2 91 23 22 6.6 6.4 
Senegal 1992-93 9.9 76 21.7 21.6 49.1 6 
Senegal 1997 12.5 69    5.7 
Senegal 2005 15.2 71 14 16.3 58.7 5.3 
Senegal 2008-09 17.7 61    4.9 
The picture is a bit less positive in relation to infant mortality; while in most countries it falls over the 
period covered by the surveys, it does not fall in Cameroon, Chad and Guinea.  Cameroon's level of  
infant mortality remains high given its income level.  In addition, infant mortality in Kenya in 2008-9 is 
no better than it was in 1989 even though  it has fallen in recent years.  Something similar applies in 
Nigeria where the current situation  is only slightly better than it was in 1990.  Clearly the situation 
became a lot worse before it started to improve recently.  Under five mortality (data not presented here) 
shows a similar pattern for these three countries.  
By contrast Ghana, Malawi, Senegal, Ethiopia and Benin all show impressive progress.  There is some 
association between progress in monetary poverty reduction and improvement in infant mortality rates.  
Burkina Faso, which did quite well in reducing income poverty over the 1998-2003 period, did rather 
less well in terms of  reducing its infant mortality over the same period. 
On balance though the situation in relation to infant mortality is either neutral (little change) or of  
improvements, but the position is often less positive in relation to other health indicators.  The two 
measures of  malnutrition reported in the table only consistently fall in Ghana and Senegal, and to a 
lesser extent Ethiopia (which also happen to be some of  the more successful countries in terms of  
reducing monetary poverty).  Given the slow changing nature of  these indicators this represents 
impressive progress in these cases.  By contrast both measures of  malnutrition worsen over the 
corresponding periods in Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Guinea, while little change is observed in Chad 
over a period of  8 years.  Benin, Kenya and Malawi and Nigeria show progress in reducing the 
incidence of  underweight children, though show a worsening position in relation to stunting (or little 
progress in the case of  Nigeria).  Some countries which have made some progress in reducing 
monetary poverty have made less progress with malnutrition.  In some cases improvements in mortality 
may be associated with worsening malnutrition outcomes, in children that would previously have died 
now survive. 
The percentage of  children fully vaccinated though generally improves, at least over more recent 
periods, with the exception of  Benin and Chad where respectively it deteriorates or remains unchanged 
at a very low level.  The percentage of  children fully vaccinated increases dramatically over this period 
in Ghana, Senegal and increases to a lesser extent (over shorter periods) in Ethiopia and Guinea.  In 
Burkina Faso, Kenya, Malawi and Nigeria, this indicator had declined in earlier periods, but in each case 
it has started to increase again recently.    In addition, the number of  births which take place in a 
modern facility (data not reported here) show improvements in recent years in almost all countries, 
though the proportion of  mothers giving birth in modern facilities remains very low in Chad and 
especially in Ethiopia.  This shows some progress in terms of  delivery of  health care, and this often 
occurs also in countries which did less well in terms of  growth or reducing monetary poverty. 
The general pattern which comes from both the consideration of  trends in monetary and non-
monetary indicators is of  significant and sustained  progress in Ghana and Senegal, and good progress 
to in Ethiopia; this is generally the case across all the non-monetary indicators considered here.  These 
countries, which have had good growth performance over the period, have made good progress in 
terms of  poverty reduction.  Malawi and Nigeria have performed better in recent years, following 
earlier periods of  decline or lack of  progress; there is perhaps also the beginning of  evidence of  
progress in poverty reduction in Kenya.  In some cases this progress may remain fragile or uncertain 
e.g. the political situation in Nigeria or the dependence on subsidies in Malawi.  But the remaining 
countries are ones where progress has been less consistent (Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea) or where 
there has been very little progress (Cameroon, the wealthiest country here to begin with, and Chad, the 
poorest to begin with).  The extent of  progress or not is often quite closely associated with growth 
performance, though this association is weaker in the cases of  Burkina Faso and Kenya.  This is not 
though to claim anything about causality, at least in relation to the non-monetary indicators; what seems 
to be the case is that successful countries such as Ethiopia, Ghana and Senegal perform well in many 
areas, not just growth but also delivery of  health and education services; countries that have done less 
well in growth terms also have done less well in terms of  delivering health care to their populations. 
Finally, the total fertility rate is also reported in Table 3, not so much as an outcome measure but rather 
to judge the demographic context of  each country, which is also relevant to the observed welfare 
outcomes.  This clearly shows two categories of  country in terms of  trends in total fertility rate.  
Ghana, Kenya and Senegal show sharp reductions in fertility rates over the periods covered by the data; 
and Malawi has also shown a reduction.  But in the other countries the total fertility rate has scarcely 
changed.  The total fertility rate is particularly high in Chad and Burkina Faso, but also in Benin, 
Guinea and Nigeria.  High and slowly changing fertility rates may be associated with less progress in 
reducing both monetary and non-monetary poverty indicators.  The two most successful countries in 
terms of  poverty reduction are also two of  the cases that reduced fertility the most.  Ethiopia, the third 
successful country in terms of  poverty reduction did not reduce fertility much over the period shown 
in the table, but the fertility rate from the recently published DHS for 2011 was 4.8, a significant 
reduction from 5.4 in 2005.  Kenya though, despite reducing fertility, has delivered much less so far in 
terms of  progress in poverty outcomes; Burkina Faso reduced some aspects of  poverty over the 1998 
to 2003 period even if  fertility only fell to a modest extent.  Fertility is potentially an important factor 
underlying the changes observed here. 
7.  Conclusions and scope for development  
Household survey evidence based on these 11 significant African countries provides a picture of  
changes in poverty which complements and in some ways challenges findings of  other studies on 
recent poverty reduction in Africa in the context of  renewed growth.  It is not straightforward though 
to use the evidence discussed here to draw conclusions about aggregate changes in monetary poverty in 
SubSaharan Africa; the periods covered differ from country to country, the underlying surveys and the 
poverty lines are not comparable etc.  Nonetheless, the World Bank findings of  quite significant 
poverty reduction over recent years (a reduction of  nearly 5 percentage points between 2005 and 2008) 
may be consistent with the country findings here, especially bearing in mind that other countries like 
Rwanda and Uganda that appear to have performed quite well in poverty reduction terms were not 
included here.  Much though depends on a clear picture of  what has happened in Nigeria (a recent 
report suggested increased poverty between 2004 and 2010, though this information is not publicly 
available, and the comparability of  the underlying data is not clear).     
The findings here though are less supportive of  the rapid poverty reduction reported by both Sala-i-
Martin and Pinhovskiy and Young.  The pattern of  change in DHS indicators is not consistently 
positive (as Young concluded mainly in relation to assets); some indicators such as assets and education 
show strong progress, but mortality and more particularly malnutrition show a much less consistent 
pattern of  progress.  Some countries have indeed done well, but a number of  significant countries have 
indeed done well.  Further the DHS evidence is not a sufficient basis to question the reliability of  
growth estimates.  The Sala-i-Martin-Pinhovskiy methodology has been strongly criticised here, but 
their finding of  consistent poverty reduction across a wide range of  African countries is absolutely not 
supported by the more reliable household survey based evidence at the country level. 
This paper considered only evidence on 11 of  the 25 largest SubSaharan African countries, given that 
these were based on careful studies applying a consistent methodology.  There are though available 
carefully conducted studies of  a number of  other SubSaharan African countries which have also 
applied high standards to ensure comparability of  their poverty estimates over time; and of  course 
DHS data are available at more than one point in time for 21 of  these 25 countries.  This story is 
currently being extended to a wider group of  countries; preliminary results though suggest the same 
mix of  experience: a number of  countries have reduced poverty (in monetary or non-monetary terms) 
significantly while others have made much less progress. 
It is important too to bear in mind that much of  the poverty evidence presented here is from periods 
either before or towards the beginning of  the recent increase in growth in many of  these countries; 
more recent poverty data when available may show a more positive picture. 
Focusing on the period for which we do have data, most countries considered in this paper have been 
able to reduce poverty over the periods considered, though there has been a variety of  experience.  
Ghana and Senegal show the most positive picture of  having reduced poverty over long periods of  
time; growth has been a very important driver of  the monetary poverty reduction in Ghana while in 
Senegal falling inequality was also important.  Ethiopia reduced monetary poverty by quite a large 
magnitude over a shorter period, again a period of  decent growth performance.  In all three cases most 
non-monetary indicators also improved significantly.  While growth may have been a driver of  
monetary poverty reduction, its link to the non-monetary indicators is likely to be much weaker; what is 
much more likely is that these countries represented good policy environments in terms of  growth and 
delivery of  health and education services.  What has happened to fertility (which fell in all cases) is also 
likely to be an important factor in shaping the observed outcomes. 
Other countries seem to have had a mixed record in terms of  poverty trends over the periods 
considered here, but appear to have reduced poverty and improved non-monetary indicators in recent 
years; this is the case for example for Malawi, Nigeria, and to some extent Kenya.  Progress has often 
been slower than in the previous cases and more time is needed to judge longer term prospects, but in 
each case there is evidence of  significant improvements in recent years. 
The case of  the remaining countries is more mixed.  Cameroon and Chad have performed poorly 
across the range of  available poverty indicators over the periods considered here; whether the situation 
has improved in Chad since it started to exploit its oil resources cannot be judged on the basis of  the 
indicators available here, though the discussion in the country study suggests that this may not be likely.  
The other countries, Benin, Burkina Faso and Guinea, are cases of  slow or mixed progress in poverty 
reduction.  Monetary poverty fell quite a lot in the 1998-2003 period in Burkina, though this may be 
partly driven by agricultural conditions in the two years; certainly non-monetary poverty indicators 
showed a less consistent pattern of  progress.  A similar comment applies to Benin and Guinea; 
monetary poverty fell in recent periods, but non-monetary indicators did not always show consistent 
progress.  
Many questions are of  course raised by the evidence presented on this study.  The first is the need to 
extend it to a wider range of  countries and indicators, including as part of  this to look for  more recent 
evidence from the period of  the recent growth upturn.  The changing pattern of  inequality also needs 
to be considered in more depth; the evidence presented here suggested that inequality fell in more 
countries than it rose, but this too needs to be considered in more depth.  Another important issue is to 
investigate more the drivers of  changes in non-monetary, seeing to what extent these are or are not 
associated (on whatever timescale) with monetary poverty or with growth; but the role of  public 
spending and aid in influencing these outcomes also needs to be considered in more depth. 
In sum though the story of  this paper is of  positive progress in poverty reduction in Africa over the 
last decade or so, even it at different rates in different locations.  This is perhaps the most positive 
period of  poverty reduction in Africa since independence, and it may be that the picture will be still 
more positive when more information is available on the most recent time period. 
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